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Consuming Obsessions: Housing, Homicide,
and Mass Incarceration since 1950
JonathanSimon t

When we think about the relationship between crime and
the economy, the nexus most likely to come to mind is employment.1 In this Article I propose a very different framework for
thinking about the economic context of crime-one based on
housing. Like the employment-crime nexus, the relationship between housing and crime can point to a multitude of different
dynamics, concerning the incentives to commit crimes and the
incentives of the public to react to fear of crime. Here, I focus on
just one dynamic: many Americans switched from renting to
owning their homes during the second half of the 20th century,
and this shift, I will argue, made the public more fearful of crime
and thus more inclined to support aggressive law-and-order policies. Alongside the well-documented rise in violent crime (homicide in particular) in the early 1960s, 2 the post-WWII trend of
t Professor of Law, UC Berkeley, School of Law. Thanks to Omari French, Berkeley
Law, Class of 2010 for research assistance. Any errors have been introduced through my
efforts to speculate on the record.
1 Economists, sociologists, and criminologists have identified no shortage of links.
During periods when jobs are scarce, the potential gains from crime may become more
attractive. See Richard Freeman, Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes
and What Might We Do about It?, 10 J Econ Persp 25, 31 (1996) (noting that rewards of
crime appeared to be rising in the early 1990s). Periods of unemployment might also lead
to changes in the social networks and social capital of the unemployed, changes that may
be associated with deviant behavior and ultimately criminal behavior. See John Hagan,
Social Embeddedness of Crime and Unemployment, 31 Criminol 465, 469 (1993). Longterm unequal stratification of opportunity (class) may produce structural incentives for
crime, as those with significantly fewer opportunities attempt to fulfill general cultural
goals of success without access to the approved institutional means necessary to achieve
those ends may turn to antisocial means to do so. See Robert K. Merton, Social Structure
and Anomie, 38 Am Sociol Rev 672, 674 (1938). In periods of growing economic inequality,
governments may face populist demands to respond to crime with harsh punishment as
an alternative to welfarist policies ruled out by the logics of neoliberal political economy.
See generally Loic Wacquant, Punishingthe Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Insecurity (Duke 2009). Meanwhile, the punishment of crime through incarceration clearly reduces the economic opportunities of the formerly incarcerated, predisposing them to all the
risks of the unemployment-crime nexus. See Bruce Western, Punishment and Inequality
in America 109 (Sage 2006).
2 On the rise of violent crime, see generally Franklin E. Zimring, The Great American Crime Decline (Oxford 2007); David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and

165

166

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2010:

suburbanization 3 helped to lay the foundation for "mass incarceration." 4
Since the 1960s, violent crime has been a central issue for
government at all levels. 5 The crime surge of the early twentieth
century did create governmental responses at all levels, including the federal government. 6 However, the scale and duration of
the government's response was qualitatively different. In the
1920s and 1930s, states and the federal government built new
prisons and engaged in escalated rhetoric about crime. Since the
1970s, states and the federal government have engaged in an
unprecedented program of prison building and tougher penal
policies, producing a more than six-fold increase in the incarceration rate since the mid-1970s 7 (compared to about a 90 percent
8
increase in the 1930s over the previous period).
As I explain in greater detail in Part II, fear of violent crime,
and especially homicide, has played a crucial role in conceptually
and materially re-spatializing American capitalism from an urban industrial base to a new suburban base anchored in real estate and the kind of personal consumerism associated with the
(until now) ever-expanding American home. In return, the
Social Orderin ContemporarySociety (Chicago 2001).
3 The relationship between suburban housing and a growing sense of insecurity is a
key point in David Garland's analysis of the "culture of control." See Garland, The
Culture of Control at 84-85 (cited in note 2). On suburbanization, see generally Lizabeth
Cohen, A Consumer's Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America
(Knopf 2003).
4 Sociologists have used the term "mass incarceration" to highlight two features of
contemporary imprisonment in the United States: (1) its quantitative scale, which is a
marked departure from historical patterns, and (2) the tendency to use imprisonment in a
much more wholesale manner, on whole categories of criminal offenders, rather than in
the more individualized manner in which the penalty of incarceration has been historically applied to its subjects. See generally David Garland, The Meaning of Mass Incarceration, 3 Pun & Soc 5 (2001). See also Bruce Western, Punishment and Inequality in America 11-33 (Russell Sage 2006).
5 See generally Jonathan Simon, Governing through Crime: How the War on Crime
Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear(Oxford 2007), where I
argue that political elites in both parties pursued crime as a privileged social problem to
focus their different policy agendas. In this Article I am not abandoning this political view
of mass incarceration so much as attempting to understand the cognitive and cultural
conditions that made the US such productive ground for developing what Garland calls
the "culture of control." See Garland, 3 Pun & Soc at 5 (cited in note 4).
6 Among other things the US created a national commission on crime in 1928,
known historically by the name of its chairman, former Attorney General George Wickersham. See Samuel Walker, PopularJustice: A History of American Criminal Justice 154
(Oxford 2d ed 1997).
7 See Bruce Western and Becky Petit, Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race
and Class Inequality in US Incarceration,69 Am Sociol Rev 151 (2004).
8 James Austin and Barry Krisberg, Incarcerationin the United States: The Extent
and Future of the Problem, 478 Annals Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 15, 18 (1985).
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movement of the American middle class to a new domestic platform, positioned in the suburbs, based on a model of physically
separated single-family homes, and the anchoring of the American economy in the continued growth of this real estate consumption cycle, helped to create a distinctive risk sensibility
about violent crime as a threat to the home (and home prices)
that drove the war on crime to a far greater influence than it
might otherwise have had, and influenced many of the precise
forms through which this war materialized. Consider that we
also had wars on cancer and poverty in the late 1960s and early
1970s, 9 each of which picked up on a historically potent topic for
personal and collective mobilization in America but none of
which had the broad impact of the war on crime, and none of
which had the distinctive focus on American house prices that
violent crime did.10
More specifically, I suggest in Part II that the rise of suburban home ownership in the 1950s provides an explanation for a
number of distinctive features of contemporary penality:
(1) The enormous expansion in the use of incarceration,
its shift toward a categoric (or mass) orientation, and the
relative lack of growth of public policing (compared to
both prison and private policing).
(2) The persistence of capital punishment in states where
executions rarely occur.
(3) The importance of guns to the politics of crime in
America.
The expanding suburban home ownership market provides a
good example of both the specificity of these features and the historical pattern of their unfolding. Briefly, I compare the fit of this
explanation to other plausible economic and noneconomic explanations, including labor market dynamics, the reassertion of political control by capitalism (a process often described by sociolo-

9 Simon, Governing through Crime at 259-83 (cited in note 5).
10 An interesting, if relatively minor, exception is the "Love Canal" controversy in the

late 1970s, in which the discovery of severe pollution exposure to a New York neighborhood caused popular fear about cancer and other health threats that eventually led to the
wholesale abandonment of the neighborhood. See generally Elizabeth D. Blum, Love
Canal Revisited: Race, Class, and Gender in EnvironmentalActivism (University Press of
Kansas 2008).
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gists and others as "neoliberalism), 1 1 and a backlash against the
gains of the civil rights movement. 12
In conclusion, I consider our present conjuncture in a bit
more detail. Homicide and violent-crime rates remain low relative to the highs of the 1970s and 1980s. 13 Most importantly, the
combination of growing fear of a global climate crisis and the
deep economic crisis that began in 2008 has temporarily collapsed the real-estate-based finance bubble and suggested that it
cannot be sustained in its recent form. 14 Could a long-term shift
away from home ownership and suburbanization and towards
renting and higher-density urban-style neighborhoods (whether
inside city limits or not) be underway? Could that lead to the
emergence of a new risk sensibility, one that would disfavor the
prioritizing of violent-crime risk and solutions based on mass
incarceration? The concluding section offers a necessarily speculative analysis.

I. HoME OWNERSHIP, HOMICIDE, AND RISK ASSESSMENT
It might seem self-evident that homicide is such a particularly vivid and comprehensive risk that it needs no amplification.
If homicide rates in a given society go up by 200 or 300 percent,
as they did during the 1960s, 15 popular demand for tough
measures may not seem to require much explanation; however,
both historical and comparative studies suggest that changes in
crime by themselves underdetermine the form of policy response. 16 Indeed, we have already noted that comparable increases in violent crime in the 1920s and 1930s failed to generate
as powerful a political reaction against crime as the period since
17
the 1960s.

"

See Wacquant, Punishingthe Poor (cited in note 1).
12 See generally Katherine Beckett, Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American Politics (Oxford 1997); Vesla Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the Development of PunitiveCrime Policy, 21 Stud Am Pol Dev 230 (Fall 2007).
13 Franklin E. Zimring, The Great American Crime Decline at 125 (cited in note 2).
14 See generally Elaine McKewon, UN Climate Change Report On Global Warming
(Global Research 2007), online at http/www.globalresearch.cafmdex.php?context=
va&aid=4655 (visited Sept 15, 2010); Sir Nicholas Stern, The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (HM Treasury 2006), online at http/www.hm-treasury.
gov.uk/Independent Reviews/stern-review economicsclimatechange/sternreviewindex
.cfm (visited Sept 15, 2010).
15 Zimring, The GreatAmerican Crime Decline (cited in note 2).
16 See Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, The Scale of Imprisonment 137 (Chicago 1991); Beckett, Making Crime Pay at 4 (cited in note 12).
17 Incarceration rates rose in response to Prohibition-related arrests as well as violent crime. See James Austin and John Irwin, It's about Time: America's Imprisonment
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Highlighting homeownership as a factor in risk assessment
does not disregard, in any significant sense, the rationality of the
subject. People may indeed act rationally, but they do so from a
context. In ways that have been under-discussed (at least among
legal scholars and criminologists), people who own their homes
asses risk from a very different context than comparable people
who rent their dwellings.
A.

Housing, Risk, and Knowledge about Crime

Home ownership in any economy ties the owner to a particular location in a nontrivial manner. 18 As we are painfully reminded today, housing markets are not always highly liquid.
Once a measure of concern about security is raised about a
neighborhood, real estate in that neighborhood is likely to become substantially less liquid. It is important, in this respect,
that violent crime has for decades been associated with neighborhood-specific risks (rather than being seen as a free-floating
risk that could occur anywhere with equal probability). 19 Sometimes this association is largely a function of stereotype and
20
prejudice; in other instances, it can be shockingly accurate.
While a renter may rather move his or her family to a different neighborhood in response to real or perceived risk, the homeowner has greater exposure in both a personal and a financial
sense. Homeowners may be especially fearful of burglary, a felonious theft focused on the home, rather than robbery, which although traditionally more feared and punished, is associated
Binge 257 (Wadsworth 3d ed 2001).
18 See Susan J. Smith, Beverley A. Searle, and Nicole Cook, Rethinking the Risks of
Home Ownership, 38 J Soc Policy 83, 84 (2008) (noting the risks posed to the equity of
homeowners by the inflexibility of the investment).
19 In an innovative study using Megan's Law information on the location of sex offenders to estimate the impact of a sex offender moving to a home on adjacent property
values, the investigators found that the home adjacent to a sex offender goes down 12
percent in value, while the closest home to sell goes down an average of 4 percent, with no
effect beyond one-tenth of a mile. See Leigh Linden and Jonah E. Rockoff, Estimates of
the Impact of Crime Risk on Property Values from Megan's Laws, 98 Am Econ Rev 1103,
1103 (2008).
20 A number of serial killers have operated in very specific geographic locations. In
one notorious Florida case Eddie Lee Mosely, who terrorized the African American section
of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, in the 1970s, was identified when investigators realized the
locations of the victims' bodies were closely situated in a portion of the neighborhood. The
killer turned out to live with his parents in a house close to the center of the small zone in
which he killed. See Jonathan Simon, Recovering the Craft of Policing: Wrongful Convictions, the War on Crime, and the Problem of Security, in Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. and
Austin Sarat, eds, When Law Fails:Making Sense of Miscarriagesof Justice 115, 125-34
(NYU 2009).
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more with streets and public encounters that homeowners can
(and in the suburban model of home ownership do) choose to
avoid. 2 It is the violence that enters the home, or threatens to
enter, that is particularly threatening. 22 The homeowner is also
exposed to the danger that her investment in the home, which is
often the primary vehicle for retirement savings, will be damaged by the reputational harm to the neighborhood associated
with the perception of growing crime risks.
This differential risk exposure of owners and renters should
tend to incline them toward different sensitivities to crime risk
and thresholds of action (the owner should sell well before the
renter decides to move), but perhaps even more importantly, it
inclines them toward different information streams, or
knowledge pathways, about crime. Both renters and owners have
access to two distinct streams of knowledge about crime: (1) local
knowledge, their own perception of how dangerous their area is
(perhaps informed by other local friends and neighbors), and (2)
virtual knowledge, the mediated representation of crime in the
fictional and news programming about crime. But while renters
can place as much or as little significance as they choose in the
virtual knowledge of crime, owners have strong reasons to care
how their own neighborhood is represented in that virtual crime
picture. Because the virtual representation about crime is almost
always more alarmist than local knowledge, we can expect the
owner to have not just more sensitivity but a heightened awareness of and understanding of crime. 23 The mass production of
homeownership in the United States in the decades following the
21 One of the perverse effects of California's "three-strikes" law, from a traditional
purposes-of-punishment perspective, was flattening the difference between robbery and
burglary for felons with multiple convictions (on the third strike it will not matter). See
Franklin Zimring, Gordon Hawkins, and Sam Kamin, Punishment and Democracy: Three
Strikes and You're Out in California 195 (Oxford 2001).
22 Of course the repressed element for a long time was the domestic violence within
the house. See Simon, Governing through Crime at 177-206 (cited in note 5).
23 Since the 1970s criminologists and sociologists have believed strongly that public
attitudes about crime are disproportionately shaped by media coverage and that media
coverage of crime is considerably more sensational than the overall crime situation. It
turns out that empirical research in support of the former has been difficult to sustain
convincingly, but that evidence for the latter is strong. See Jason Ditton et al, From Imitation to Intimidation:A Note on the Curious Relationship between Media, Crime and
Fearof Crime, 44 Brit J Criminol 595, 598 (2004) (reporting that evidence of sensationalism in the selection of crime news by media is solid, only about 41 percent of studies have
found a positive association between media exposure and fear of crime, but observing that
the complexities of personal interpretation of news make linear relationships difficult to
establish). For our purposes it establishes that homeowners may pay more attention to a
source of knowledge that certainly increases the availability of alarming information
about crime.
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1960s has enormously expanded the portion of the population
subject to this heightened awareness and understanding.
I argue that there is a risk mentality specific to the intersection of homeownership and homicide, one that may exist in any
time, but which became disproportionately important in the
1960s and 1970s, and remained so for the next three decades. 24
The risk of being killed, or having a loved one killed, by a
stranger who either invades the home or lurks nearby to attack
during the inevitable passage to and from home, however brief, is
logically one that stands out in this regard as one risk that is
singularly hard to prevent by either public law enforcement (because it is happening off the streets) or private choices to discipline behavior for crime safety (say, to avoid the streets, bars,
25
downtown shopping streets, or other public places).
While this risk mentality may be a broad feature of human
experience that incorporates a wide range of residential patterns,
I would argue that there are a number of features of the postWWII suburbanization and the accompanying housing boom that
exacerbated it. It was in this period that home ownership, as opposed to renting, began to be valorized as a norm for American
middle-class families and associated with all manner of private
and public virtues. The federal government subsidized this new
norm beginning in the New Deal by allowing taxpayers to deduct
their mortgage interest from their income in determining their
26
tax liability.
24 See Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity 19-20 (Sage 1992) (Mark
Ritter, trans) (describing post-industrial societies as entering into a new phase of modernity oriented around risk); Francois Ewald, The Return of Descartes'sMalicious Daemon:
An Outline of a Philosophy of Precaution, in Tom Baker and Jonathan Simon, eds, EmbracingRisk: Insurance and the ChangingCulture of Responsibility 273, 298-99 (Chicago
2002) (describing the shift from a political order anchored in solidarity and risk spreading
to one based on avoiding catastrophic risks); Evi Girling, Richard Sparks, and Ian Loader,
Crime and Social Change in Middle England: Questions of Order in an English Town
138-59 (Routledge 2000) (describing the centrality of crime to the sense of insecurity
among the English middle classes).
25 The one great and highly controversial exception being through private gun ownership. I would expect to irmd that careful qualitative research into the reasons people have
for supporting a personal right to gun ownership would show that it is linked to a sense of
being vulnerable to violent attack in or around their home. I am not aware of any direct
empirical evidence on this point. There is empirical evidence that fear of crime is associated with support for gun ownership. See R. Lance Holbert, Dhavan V. Shah, and Nojin
Kwak, Fear, Authority, and Justice: Crime-Related TV Viewing and Endorsements of
Capital Punishment and Gun Ownership, 81 Journalism & Mass Communication Q 343,
351 (2004) (finding that fear of crime increases positive attitude toward gun ownership).
26 See Gail Radford, Modern Housing for America: Policy Struggles in the New Deal
Era 2 (Chicago 1996) (federal intervention in the housing market increased markedly
during the New Deal).
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While the tenancy of ownership can apply to all kinds of residential structures (including apartments through the vehicle of
condominiums), the post-war suburban boom involved the marketing of single-family homes physically separated from one another by expanses of yard and often fences, in a setting ideally
removed from traffic, commercial life, and workplaces. While
there were many virtues associated with this pattern of development (including health, community, and aesthetics), none had
higher priority than the idea of security. This kind of household
was held out explicitly as the best way to keep families secure
from crime. 27 In short, the new housing pattern was offering not
simply shelter, or lifestyle, but a lifestyle based on security
through physical separation from the public space, and especially
28
urban public space.
This new pattern of housing became increasingly ubiquitous
in the decades following 1960, but it was concentrated in the
booming Sun Belt states that began to experience major population growth at the expense of the Midwest and Northeastern
states. 29 From Georgia and the Carolinas to Arizona and California, a forty-year boom anchored in a warmer climate, nonunion
workforces, and affordable suburban housing began after World
War II and has continued with varying degrees of intensity until
30
the present economic crisis.
Geographers, historians, and political scientists have begun
to explore the relationship between this new suburban residential pattern and the conservative politics that began to mobilize
in the 1960s.31 Lisa McGirr's study of California's Orange County
27 Nicolas Paul Retsinas and Eric S. Belsky, eds, Low-Income Homeownership: Examining the Unexamined Goal 10 (Brookings 2002) (it is commonly believed that higher
home-ownership rates mean lower crime rates).
28 For the classic statement of the relationship between spatial design and crime
security and advocating the creation of personal responsibility over space as the key to
preventing crime in urban settings, essentially bringing the suburban model of housing to
the city by privatizing space, see genrally Oscar Newman, Defensible Space: Crime Prevention through UrbanDesign (Macmillan 1972).
29 See Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in
Postwar Detroit 259-71, xviii (Princeton 1996) (describing how deindustrialization and
racial strife created blight and insecurity long before the riots or crime become objective
problems). In the early stages of that Sun Belt boom, manufacturing jobs, which moved
there from the more unionized Midwest beginning after World War II, were also a big
part of the attraction. Since the 1980s, however, the greater economic magnet throughout
these regions has been real estate itself and related enterprises.
30 On job movement to the Sun Belt, see id; Roger Waldinger, Immigration and Urban Change, 15 Annu Rev Sociol 211, 216 (1989) (describing the pattern of declining cities
in Northeast and Middle West, and the rise of Sun Belt cities).
31 See generally Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles
(Verso 1990); Mike Davis, Ecology of Fear:Los Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster
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suggests that the very style of residential development encouraged conservative values:
The result of development along these lines,.... was spatial isolation and an absence of community, which, in a
complicated way, helped to reinforce a conservative ethos.
One Santa Ana resident, for example, who in 1961 criticized the lack of neighborliness in housing developments
and called for "more community recreational activity ...
where people can get to know one another," linked the de32
pletion of community to government centralization.
But the very same ethos that supported conservative political
ideology also cultivated a model of home security based on physical separation from public space, and with it the creation of a
larger space of recreation and intimacy within the security of
home that had an appeal far beyond that ideology. As home purchasers were encouraged to invest not simply in shelter but in
security, Americans found themselves in something like a security paradox. Under these conditions the expansive promise of the
home as security zone grew in tandem with a sense of exposure
to those who might attempt to penetrate that zone with the intent of doing harm, what I will call, for the sake of brevity,
"stranger danger." The very suburban development pattern that
offered more distance from the menace of the city also created
more isolation. City life meant proximity to potential criminals,
but also proximity to neighbors and police. Suburban life had a
soft white underbelly. If a malevolent stranger were to penetrate
the geographic divide, the individual homeowner would be largely on his or her own. This was the nightmare captured in real
crimes like the Manson family murders and countless fictionalized ones. Any fan of American films can identify many examples
33
of movies that celebrate exactly this paradox.
As David Garland argues, the suburbs came to seem even
more vulnerable to their security-seeking residents when women
began to enter the workforce in droves. 34 A residential pattern
that had relied on full-time homemakers to create a community
out of the islands of backyards and cul-de-sacs came to seem
(Metropolitan 1998); Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American
Right (Princeton 2001).
32 McGirr, Suburban Warriors at 42 (cited in note 31).
33 See, for example, The Desperate Hours (1955); Straw Dogs (1971); The Last House
on the Left (1972).
34 Garland, The Cultureof Control at 154-55 (cited in note 2).
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haunted as new economic conditions forced middle-class families
to rely on two jobs.
B.

American Nightmare: The Housing Boom Meets the Crime
Wave, 1950-2000

For reasons quite independent of crime or punishment,
American political institutions began to promote mass homeownership as a foundation for the American middle class beginning
in the 1940s. Over the next sixty years this program shifted urban America from a society largely composed of renters living in
apartments and closely spaced town houses to a society largely
composed of homeowners living in houses physically separated
from one another and, to varying degrees, from public spaces,
avenues, and transportation.
Historically the key year of the transformation of Americans
into homeowners was 1950. It was the census taken during that
year which marked that for the first time a majority of occupied
housing units in the United States were owned rather than rented. 35 The most rapid period of expansion for homeownership was
between 1940 and 1960 when the percentage of owner-occupied
housing units went from around 44 percent to around 62 percent. 36 Ownership levels remained stagnant in the 1970s and
1980s, but began to grow more vigorously again in the 1990s,
reaching a twentieth-century high of 66 percent in the 2000 census. 37

As suggested above, this policy of promoting homeownership
had the presumably unintended effect of forging an American
public with heightened sensitivity to crime risk and alarmist
knowledge streams about crime. This demographic transformation interacted with the unfolding of a wave of crime and fear
of crime, both real and imaginary, that began in the 1950s and
continued, with episodic peaks and valleys, until the middle of
the 1990s, when steep reductions in violent crime (indeed most
38
categories of crime) began.

35 Frank Hobbs and Nicole Stoops, Demographic Trends in the 20th Century 1 (US
Census Bureau Nov 2002), online at http;//www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf
(visited Sept 14, 2010).
36 Id at 125.

37 Id. Home ownership in the first decade of this century probably peaked around
2007, before foreclosures forced many out of owner-occupied housing.
38 Ziring, The GreatAmerican Crime Decline at 5, 20 (cited in note 2).
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1.

1950s: Fear before the crime.

The 1950s were a decade of growing public unease about
crime. Distinct foci of concern (something criminologists often
call "moral panics") formed around sex offenders, heroin users
and dealers, and youth gangs. But over all there is little evidence
that crime was becoming more of a threat. While reported crime
series from this period are generally not considered reliable,
homicide reports are more so, and show no discernable trend for
the decade. 39
The focus of public discussion of crime was increasingly on
cities. In September of 1957, a year which would see the decade's
lowest homicide rate, Life Magazine devoted its cover to a "Major
Life Series" on "Crime in the US."4° Despite the title, the focus of
the first article was on urban crime. On the cover were an artistic rendering of young men in apparent gang attire (much of
which looks more Hollywood or Broadway influenced than criminological) and the phrase "a New York street gang." Inside,
grainy photos showed Chicago police operating in dark apartment hallways and shadowy streets as they pursued criminals.
But if the face of American crime was increasingly depicted
as an urban (and minority) one, the growing role of crime fear in
American popular culture was focused elsewhere, on suburban or
even rural homes, where relatively privileged white families living lives of apparent security might nonetheless find themselves
confronted with criminal violence.
The theme appears in movies like The Desperate Hours
(1955), which starred Humphrey Bogart as an escaped murder
on the run. Based on a 1954 novel by Joseph Hayes, the film depicts a middle-class suburban family beset by a gang of escaped
prisoners. The criminals have deliberately avoided the city,
where police might be looking for them, turning to the presumptively safe, but vulnerable and softly defended suburb. In a
theme that would be repeated across the next several decades,
the suburban family, led by its male head of household, must
learn to fight back with every means at its disposal. Released in
the midst of the relatively crime-free 1950s, The DesperateHours
39 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Homicide Trends in the US (DOJ 2010), online at
http//bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/homicide/tables/totalstab.cfm (visited Sept 15, 2010) (In
1950, there were 4.6 homicides for every 100 thousand in population in the United States.
The rate drifted down to as low as 4.0 in 1957, before rebounding to 4.9 in 1959.).
40 Robert Weaver, iflus, Youthful Gang Members, Wearing CharacteristicJackets,
CongregateNear a Street Corner in New York, Life Magazine, cover (Sept 9, 1957).
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rehearses the posture that fearful and angry citizens would take
toward tough-on-crime measures in the coming decades.
What became known as the crime wave of the 1960s (and
1970s) would not commence in any statistically visible way until
the middle of the decade. Anxiety about crime, however, built
throughout the 1950s, shifting across a variety of now-familiar
"folk devils," 41 sex offenders, drug pushers, and gang members,
all the while focusing more and more on the dyad of dangerous
cities and vulnerable suburbs. The efforts of political elites to
focus on crime as a threat to America were already very clearly
beginning in this decade, particularly among southern politicians
attempting to defend the increasingly indefensible institution of
Jim Crow segregation. 42 The mass media, particularly the new
media of television, seemed drawn to urban violence and the
threat to life and property in many of America's great cities.
Moreover, the media tended to treat violence on the streets as a
new phenomenon in the 1960s, as if it had no history in those
same cities. 43 Both factors help explain the salience of crime before the emergence of objective evidence of an increasing crime
threat. But what made the American public so ready to be
alarmed and entertained by the prospect of violent crime? The
passing in the 1950s of the watershed between a renter and a
homeowner society and the rapid increase of home ownership in
that decade, spurred by both government efforts and increasing
affluence, provide an explanation at the level of individual preferences and also one that fits the historical pattern.
2.

Kitty Genovese and the undoing of urban security in the
1960s.

The emergence of violent crime as a central public concern
during the 1960s has long fascinated sociologists and political
scientists. By 1968, when Richard Nixon won a closely contested
election with a campaign promising "law and order," a combination of riots, assassinations, and increasing reports of violent
crime had become the dominant frame for discussing the nation's
41 See Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creationof Moral Panics 12, 8 (Blackwell 3d ed 2002) ("folk devils" are individuals or social categories in whom the
community, generally led by the media, impute a far greater threat than a rational assessment might suggest, primarily because their conduct or character challenge the normative or power structure of society).
42 See generally Beckett, Making Crime Pay (cited in note 12).
'3 On the media focus on crime, see id at 60-64 (describing influence of media in
disseminating a law-and-order message about crime in the 1960s).
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cities and social problems generally. A result, widely discussed at
the time, was an increased flight of middle-class families from
cities to surrounding suburbs. 44 As we have seen, by the mid1950s, a sense that America's large cities were dangerous was
beginning to spread. In between, it is not hard to identify distinct
moments when the sense of urban security received serious
blows even if it is impossible to show that at one point it became
fundamentally undone for a generation of Americans with means
45
(especially those with families).
One moment that may well have had an outsized influence
on public sentiment was the murder of Kitty Genovese on March
14, 1964. Genovese was not a celebrity. She was one of a growing
number of ordinary persons murdered in the city limits of America's great cities in 1964 (the second year of a rise in homicides
that would continue for the next fifteen years). Her killing (a vicious assault with a knife) and sexual assault, initially noted on
page 26 of the New York Times, 46 came to be famous from a series of factors amplified by a second investigative feature story
that appeared in the Times more than a week later on March 27,
written by Martin Gansberg and titled 37 Who Saw Murder
47
Didn't Call the Police.
As reframed by the Times, the central fact of the murder was
that it took place in public, as witnessed by some thirty-eight
neighbors in Genovese's apartment building and nearby, over a
prolonged period of time, and that while all of those people were
aware of her peril, none of them alerted the police.
Miss Genovese screamed: "Oh, my God, he stabbed me!
Please help me! Please help me!"
From one of the upper windows in the apartment house, a
man called down: "Let that girl alone!"

44 See generally Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern
Conservatism (Princeton 2005). See also Cardell K. Jacobson, Desegregation Rulings and
Public Attitude Changes: White Resistance or Resignation?, 84 Am J Sociol 698, n 3
(1978).
45 For example, the Watts riot of July 1965, the Detroit riot of July 1968, the mass
murder of eight young nursing students in a Chicago apartment by Richard Speck, also in
1968. See generally, Rick Perlstein, Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (Scribner 1968), for a discussion of all of these events and their influence
on American politics.
46 Queens Woman Is Stabbed to Death in Frontof Home, NY Times 26 (Mar 14, 1964).
47 Martin Gansberg, 37 Who Saw Murder Didn't Call the Police, NY Times 1 (Mar 27,
1964).
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The assailant looked up at him, shrugged, and walked
down Austin Street toward a white sedan parked a short
distance away. Miss Genovese struggled to her feet.
Lights went out. The killer returned to Miss Genovese,
now trying to make her way around the side of the building by the parking lot to get to her apartment. The assailant stabbed her again.
"I'm dying!" she shrieked. "I'm dying!"
Windows were opened again, and lights went on in many
apartments. The assailant got into his car and drove
away. Miss Genovese staggered to her feet. A city bus, 010, the Lefferts Boulevard line to Kennedy International
Airport, passed. It was 3:35 A.M.
The assailant returned. By then, Miss Genovese had
crawled to the back of the building, where the freshly
painted brown doors to the apartment house held out
hope for safety. The killer tried the first door; she wasn't
there. At the second door, 82-62 Austin Street, he saw her
slumped on the floor at the foot of the stairs. He stabbed
her a third time-fatally.
It was 3:50 by the time the police received their first call,
from a man who was a neighbor of Miss Genovese. In two
minutes they were at the scene. The neighbor, a 70-yearold woman, and another woman were the only persons on
48
the street. Nobody else came forward.
The paradox immediately intrigued social psychologists who saw
in it a potentially far more general dynamic, and one with plenty
of social-policy consequences. What some called the "bystander
effect" predicts that as the number of potential rescuers grows,
the likelihood of any individual stepping forward to help someone
declines. 49 The person whose victimization is widely visible, like
Kitty Genovese, may, counterintuitively, be in more trouble than
a victim whose peril is known only to a few.
The background features of the case also helped determine
that the young woman's murder would be remembered for dec48

Id.

49 John Darley, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility, 8
J Personality & Soc Psych 377, 379 (1968).
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ades after. The victim was, indeed, a young unmarried female, a
category of victim with powerful resonance in our culture. The
victim was returning from work late at night, a situation of vulnerability that seems particularly intolerable because it is a necessary consequence to work itself, and not a hazard undertaken
voluntarily in pursuit of adventure or pleasure. (Ironically, Genovese was returning from a bar where she worked. Had she been
returning from a bar where she had gone to drink, she might not
have proven as sympathetic a victim.) The murder was violent
and prolonged, unfolding much like a scene in a horror movie or
nightmare, with Genovese's slow, painful effort to crawl to safety
and the killer's search to find her.
If Gansberg's article was not enough to turn the Queens rape
and murder into a national parable about urban insecurity, New
York Times editor Abe Rosenthal magnified the impact by publishing a widely discussed book about the case later that year,
titled, after the article, Thirty-Eight Witnesses: The Kitty Geno50
vese Case.
While some now contest the accuracy of the Times' original
reporting, Rosenthal's theory that witnesses in mass housing
settings would never feel responsible for acting became a quasiscientific gospel among educated middle-class readers, people
also acutely aware of increasing concerns about urban crime
(which as we have seen had been framed as a problem in the media since the mid-1950s).
The murder of Kitty Genovese seemed to confirm a sociological premise running back at least a century, blaming urban conditions for increases in reported crimes, but careful historical
reconstruction suggests that this association was largely a myth,
a function of improving detection of crime and apprehension of
criminals and bias against the social and moral features of urban
life. 5 1 Hidden behind modernist fear of cities was a very old logic
by which towns and cities were for centuries considered safer
against crime then rural settings. It was on the highways and on
isolated farms that a person was vulnerable to violent crime. 52 In
town neighbors, supported by the civil institutions of mutual aid
50 A. M. Rosenthal, Thirty-Eight Witnesses: The Kitty Genovese Case (McGraw-Hill
1964).
51 For a summary of the debate and evidence from 19th century Germany that cities
were not more dangerous in terms of crime, see Eric A. Johnson, Cities Don't Cause
Crime: Urban-RuralDifferences in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Century German
Criminality,16 Soc Sci Hist 129, 144 (1992).
52 Id at 145.
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and later by professional police, provided help against criminal
assault. Genovese's death struck at both these sources of security: if thirty-eight watched and no one felt responsible to intervene, then the promise of rescue by police was futile.
As a piece of popularized social science with a highly problematic empirical base, Kitty Genovese's case and the bystander
effect might be compared to the highly influential "broken windows" theory about the effects of increasing enforcement of minor
public-order laws, except that instead of influencing mayors and
police chiefs, the Genovese case was a broken windows" theory
for middle-class families, one that constituted a powerful advertisement for moving out of urban apartment buildings and into
suburban cul-de-sacs.
3.

Helter skelter to gimme shelter.

If events like the murder of Kitty Genovese helped to mark
cities as places of violence and danger and encourage flight to the
suburbs, they did not yet define mass incarceration as a necessary solution. To many contemporaries, the solution was to improve police response abilities. Kitty Genovese had tried to reach
a police call box when she first saw the suspicious stranger who
attacked her, and overall the assault took as much as a half
hour, with many moments when a police intervention could have
saved Genovese's life (she was alive when they arrived but died
soon afterwards). Indeed, the main thrust of anti-crime policies
in the late 1960s was mostly focused on enhancing police capacity.
All along the suburban home was shadowed, at least in the
imaginary world of popular culture, by the possibility that crime
and violence might find their way from the city (or from prison)
into the presumably safer but easily penetrated suburb. Once
attacked in the home, movies like The Desperate Hours suggested, survival would depend on self-help and the homeowner's internal masculine capacity to defend the home. The same theme
was presented brilliantly in Truman Capote's best-selling book,
In Cold Blood, which told the "true" story of two young exprisoners who invade a Kansas farmhouse and kill the entire
family in 1959. 53 While the crime itself took place before the
crime wave of the 1960s can be said to have begun, the book was
published (and became a huge bestseller) in 1966, and a very

53 Truman Capote, In Cold Blood (Random House 1966).
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popular movie appeared in 1967, right as consciousness about
homicide as a social problem was rising (and in the midst of the
assassinations and riots).
But it would not be long before reality far outstripped the
ability of popular culture to embody the fear that was forming as
a shadow alongside the security of the home. Between sunset on
August 8th, 1969, and sunrise on August 10th, seven people were
brutally murdered in two expensive suburban-style Los Angeles
houses. The murders were initially known as the Tate-Labianca
murders after movie star Sharon Tate, who died along with four
others in the Topanga Canyon house, and Leno and Rosemary
Labianca, owners of grocery stores and other businesses, who
were murdered in their home in the Los Felice neighborhood of
Los Angeles. 54 Eventually, the murders were blamed on Charles
Manson and four other individuals (three women and one man)
said to be members of a virtual murder cult surrounding Manson
and known as "The Family." Manson and the four were convicted
of the seven murders and sentenced to death in March of 1971.
The Manson Family murders of August 8th and 9th, 1969,
remain among the most widely known mass murders in American history. Typically, they are treated historically as a closing
chapter on the "flower power" phase of the 1960s, but they also
belong to a history of criminal violence in the late 1960s and early 1970s that is rather astounding. As with the murder of Kitty
Genovese, the Tate-Labianca killings were well placed to crystallize and disseminate a compelling picture of the violent-crime
risk. They took place in Los Angeles, the media capital of the nation. They involved a movie star and several lesser celebrities.
The crimes themselves were extraordinarily horrifying. In each
case the killers were young people who attacked the victims with
no intent other than slaughtering them (on Manson's orders).
Scores of books and movies have kept the horror of the crimes
going for intervening four decades.
As with Kitty Genovese's murder, the Tate-Labianca murders are also about housing and the relationship of homicide to
housing. If the Genovese case marked urban neighborhoods as
death traps, Tate-Labianca carried a chilling message for those
who had sought greater security in more secluded suburban-style
housing; in the suburbs, "no one can hear you scream." 55 Here
54 Steve Oney, Manson: An Oral History, LA Mag 94 (July 2009), online at
http;//www.lamag.corVfeaturedarticle.aspx?id=16882 (visited Oct 3, 2010).
55 In both the August 1969 murders, the killers relied on knives to stab most of the
victims to death. Despite what must have been terrifying screams from the victims, no
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there was no bystander problem. Had any of the neighbors heard
screams, they may well have called the police, but due to the privacy-oriented layout of the two houses, no one heard. The Manson Family murders came to embody a risk of terrible violence
that can strike any person, even if they have taken the precaution to locate themselves far from urban centers. Manson's murderous disciples did not conform to dominant images of threat.
The murdering gang that descended on Sharon Tate and her
friends included three white women and a white man, all in their
twenties, all appearing in the "hippie style" then popular
throughout the southern California middle classes. The victims
in both houses appear to have had no idea how much of a threat
they were under and put up little resistance until well into their
encounters with their killers.
As with the Genovese case, there were lessons to be drawn
here for the ordinary person, and few even needed to wait for the
plethora of books that were written about the Manson murders
to draw them. Within days of the murders gun stores in LA were
sold out of virtually all firearms. The price of trained attack dogs
reached $1500 (in 1969 dollars). 56 Against such a risk there is no
defense of better police, or of moving to a safer neighborhood.
Manson as a security problem points in two directions. In terms
of private action, the Manson murders suggest that homeowners
need to be able to rely on themselves to achieve security through
the purchase of better alarm and security systems, as well as
firearms.
In terms of public action, the Manson murders point toward
harsh incapacitative punishments designed to permanently remove from society those who pose a risk of violence to others.
When, less than a year after Charles Manson and his associates
were sentenced to death, the California Supreme Court held the
death penalty unconstitutional (two months ahead of the US Supreme Court), 57 the outraged reaction by the state's political
leaders placed the Manson Family as the primary examples of
the threats that would now be eligible for parole.
In an interview with a reporter just after learning of the California decision, Assistant Attorney General Ronald George (now
Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court) was quoted as
follows:
one called the police, who were alerted in both cases only after the bodies were discovered
by family members or employees. Ed Sanders, The Family 222 (Thunder's Mouth 2002).
56 Id.

57 People v Anderson, 493 P2d 880 (Cal 1972); Furman v Georgia,408 US 238 (1972).
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They [the Court] made no mention of that, so the sentences become simple life sentences. That could mean that
people like Charles Manson (convicted in the seven TateLabianca murders) and Sirhan Sirhan (murderer of Sen.
Robert F. Kennedy) could be on the streets in seven
58
years.
In the same story, LA Police Chief Ed Davis (future candidate for
governor) described the threat to ordinary citizens in the most
alarming possible terms:
Murderers sentenced to life imprisonment are eligible for
parole, back on the streets, after seven years ... The decision of the "San Francisco Court" is bound to result in the
slaughter of many California citizens by an army of murderers who have been waiting for years in Death Row for
59
such an unrealistic judicial judgment.
Tate-Labianca seared into the consciousness of a generation a
vision of fear that linked homicide and houses in a scenario that
had been already rehearsed in popular culture, but would now be
magnified by the formal processes of justice (four death sentences at the original trial, including three women), and reinscribed
by further trials, appeals, parole hearings, and numerous books
and movies. In 1969, a year in which war, revolution, and even
the apocalypse seemed likely to many, Manson helped define violent crime as at least one of the major components of that apocalypse. Gimme Shelter, Mick Jagger and Keith Richard's ominous
anthem about the gathering fear of that period, first recorded
only a few months after the Tate-Labianca murders, seemed to
capture this new balance of terror perfectly, and to link it permanently and problematically to the idea of shelter.
Oh, a storm is threat'ning
My very life today
If I don't get some shelter
Oh yeah, I'm gonna fade away
War, children, it's just a shot away
It's just a shot away
War, children, it's just a shot away
58 Ed Meagher, Death PenaltyBan Assailed by Reagan; State to Appeal, LA Times Al
(Feb 19, 1972).
59 Id at 26.
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It's just a shot away...
Rape, murder!
It's just a shot away
It's just a shot away...
The shelter that the song pleads for was not love, however; it was
a home secured against the malevolent stranger that could be
waiting in the darkness outside the house no matter how "safe"
the surrounding community was. Shelter, an idea with an increasing measure of security built into it, now had a rather specific meaning: it was a house that Charlie and his creepy crawling minions could never penetrate.
4.

The gated community.

While the economic travails of the 1970s (oil shocks followed
by hyper-inflation) would stall the expansion of the American
home-owning class for a decade, they would not reverse the tectonic shift from renting to owning accomplished between 1940
and 1970. Once interest rates came down in the deep recession of
the early 1980s, home sales rebounded, and the portion of Americans who were homeowners began to grow again in the late
1980s and more rapidly still in the 1990s. The homicide rate began to turn down in most of the United States during the 1970s.
Combined with the stalling and even shrinkage of the home owning portion of the population, this may help explain why incarceration rates remained low in the 1970s despite the ratcheting
up of law-and-order rhetoric. Homicide would spike again in the
late 1980s and stay high through the early 1990s, the same period in which homeownership growth had recovered, and with it,
enhanced crime insecurity. Ironically, deep declines in violent
crime began to become visible by the end of the 1990s. In the
most dramatic cases, like New York City, homicide rates dropped
to levels unseen since the early 1960s, a trend which has contin60
ued in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
In the meantime, the linkage between homes and fear of violent crime has become ever tighter (notwithstanding the crime
decline). The threat of violent crime reaching the occupants of
homes, particularly children, continues to be the most politically
60 Zimring, The Great American Crime Decline at 51-52 (cited in note 2). See also
Steven D. Levitt, UnderstandingWhy Crime Fell in the 1990s: FourFactors That Explain
the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J Econ Persp 163, 166 (2004) (finding that reports of
violent crime in the US decreased by 33.6 percent from the 1990s through 2001).
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productive source of crime policies. Consider two crimes of the
1990s that have continued to shape current crime policies, the
murders of Megan Kanka and Polly Klaas. Both were young girls
taken near their homes in secure suburban areas and murdered
by released prisoners with a record of violent crime.
Polly Klaas was twelve in 1993 when she was kidnapped
from her mother's home in Petaluma, California, and murdered
by Richard Allen Davis, a paroled felon with a long record of burglaries and assaults. Public outrage that Davis had been released
from prison numerous times following parole violations and criminal convictions led to the adoption of the nation's most severe
"three-strikes" law aimed at assuring that persons with repeated
violent (or serious) crimes can receive enhanced prison sentences
(including twenty-five years to life on a third felony conviction for
61
someone with two violent or serious crimes).
Megan Kanka was seven when she was lured into a house
near her Hamilton Township, New Jersey home by Jesse
Timindequas, a released felon with a record of sexually molesting
children, who raped and murdered her in 1994. Following her
death, New Jersey adopted a law requiring sex offenders to register with authorities and requires authorities to alert neighbors
and children's facilities to the presence of sex offenders in their
vicinity. 62 Registration and notification laws were soon adopted
by many other states 6 3 and then made into a requirement for
states to receive federal subsidies for law enforcement. 64 More
recent laws have banned sex offenders from living within a specific distance (typically two thousand feet) of a school, park, or
other child-intensive-use facilities. 65 The result has been to red-

61 AB 971, 1994 Cal Legis Serv Ch 12, codified at Cal Penal Code § 667.
62 An Act concerning registration of sex offenders (Megan's Law), 1994 NJ Sess Law
Serv 133, codified at NJ Rev Stat §§ 2C:7-1-7-5 and 2C:52-2.
63 See, for example, Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 13-3821; NY Correct Law § 168 (Consol
2008); Fla Stat §947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2006); Fla Stat §948.30(1)(b) (2006); Ind Code Ann
§11-13-3-4(g)(2)(B) (West 2006); Ind Code Ann §35-38-2-2.2(2) (West 2006); La Code Crim
Proc Ann art 15:538(D)(1)(c) (2006); Or Rev Stat §144.642(1)(a) (2006); Tex Code Crim
Proc Ann art 42.12(13B) (Vernon 2006); W Va Code §62-12-26(b)(1) (2006). See also
Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Law: The Punishment,Liberty, Deprivation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90
Nw U L Rev 788, 795 (1996).
64 Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program, codified at 42 USC § 14071 (USCA 2006).
65 See, for example, Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica's Law, Cal
Penal Code § 3003.5 (providing that registered sex offenders may not reside within two
thousand feet of schools or parks; enacted by voter initiative as Proposition 83 § 21 in

1996).
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line whole neighborhoods and some whole cities for those con66
victed of a sex offense.
It was also in the 1990s that the gated community became
the model style of new housing units being built in the United
States. The now-ubiquitous style generally involves a gated security post at any street entering the subdivision. Although there is
tremendous variability in how much security such posts actually
provide (if they are even staffed at all), the fact that a large portion of new homes across a wide range of class levels are generally equipped with gates shows how much it has become part of the
signature of security, and therefore of homeownership itself.
The gate, whether staffed or not, is only symbolic of the multiple layers of security Americans now consider as part of the
common-sense vision of the home. Some of those layers are purely private-for instance, the gun in the nightstand. Some belong
to the semi-public realm of homeowner associations and private
police. 67 Others, like three strikes, Megan's Laws, and the death
penalty are public policies made in the image of private insecurity. It is this "security" home with its real and imagined layers of
protection, and always the penumbra of insecurity, that provides
the real context in which the often criticized and lampooned
American fear of crime is, in fact, a rational response to their
specific spatial imaginary. While actual victims of violent crime
tend to be poor and are unlikely to own their homes, the citizen
as potential crime victim that now forms the idealized subject of
our time is implicitly a homeowner.6 8 In the following Part, I will
suggest that this context and the risk mentality it helps animate
provides a better-fitting explanation for the specific features of
crime policy and practice in the United States than the leading
economic and political theories.
II. CRIME POLICY AS HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE

In the Part above I have laid out a description of a distinctive kind of risk mentality that is encouraged by homeownership
66 Marisa Lagos, Jessica'sLaw Means Sex Offenders Roam Streets, SF Chron Al (Apr
4, 2010).
67 On homeowner associations, see generally Evan McKenzie, Privatopia:Homeowner
Associations and the Rise of Residential Private Government (Yale 1994); Edward J.
Blakely and Mary Gale Snyder, Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United
States (Brookings 1997). On private police, see generally David A. Sklansky, The Private
Police, 46 UCLA L Rev 1165 (2001); Elizabeth Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police,
2005 Utah L Rev 573 (2005).
68 Garland, The Culture of Control at 11 (cited in note 2); Simon, Governing through
Crime at 33-110 (cited in note 5).
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and which I argue became increasingly prevalent in the United
States after 1950 as expanding home ownership became a major
objective of public and private policy. I have also provided a selective history of the rise of violent crime as a social problem in
the United States since the 1960s. It is the union of these two
trends, more homeownership and more violent crime (or at least
greater availability or salience of violent crime as a subject of
fear), that I argue helps explain not only the priority of crime
control policies in the United States, but also the specific and
even peculiar forms that those policies in aggregate have taken.
While clearly not the only social, demographic, economic, or political factor driving mass incarceration and the war on crime over
the past forty years, home ownership and its accompanying risk
sensibilities should be seen as an important intervening variable
between crime and crime policies.
A.

Home Is Where the Fear Is
1. Mass incarceration versus police.

If one goes back to 1968, the original moment when the
emergence of crime as an influential political framework announced itself in such forms as the Omnibus Safe Streets and
Crime Control Act of that year and in the rhetoric of Richard
Nixon's law-and-order campaign for president,6 9 there is little to
foreshadow the enormous expansion of prisons to follow, nor the
evisceration of the rehabilitative penology and its individualizing
model of incarceration. 70 If there is an emphasis to be found in
that year, it is police: providing more resources to police depart1
ments and less judicial interference with law enforcement. It
would be another decade and a half before the war on crime became focused on expanding the use of incarceration and giving
prosecutors greater power over the length of incarceration by
eliminating parole release. However, even with its late start,
mass incarceration has greatly outstripped the expansion of public policing. Since 1970, public spending on prisons in the United
States has gone up by 375 percent, compared to just 20 percent
72
for police.
69 See Simon, Governing through Crime at 41-42 (cited in note 5); Rick Perlstein,
Nixonland at 238 (cited in note 45).
70 Garland, The Culture of Control at 11 (cited in note 2).
71 Malcolm Feeley and Austin Sarat, The Policy Dilemma: Federal Crime Policy and
Law Enforcement 137 (Minnesota 1980).
72 Justin McCrary, Dynamic Perspectives on Crime, in Bruce L. Benson and Paul R.
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Doubtless this disparity is overdetermined by a number of
factors. For one, despite the symbolic importance of police to the
war on crime, they are not well positioned to receive funding.
Police agencies are located in municipal and county governments, which almost everywhere are far more resource poor than
state governments (which pay for most prison and correctional
costs).7 3 Federal support for police has in various periods (predominantly in Democratic administrations) expanded, but since
the 1980s any expansion has come on top of rather than instead
of federal spending to subsidize state prison expenses. Another
factor is until recently, most criminal-justice experts thought it
74
unlikely that police could reduce crime through better tactics.
Instead, the thrust of criminological thinking from the 1970s
through the 1990s was on the ability of imprisonment to reduce
crime through incapacitation. 75 However, given the importance of
populism and appeals to voters in the expansion of the war on
crime, it is difficult to believe that prisons could have edged out
police quite so dramatically, despite insider advantages, if this
prioritization of imprisonment did not also fit well with the popular demand for crime security.
This differential demand for prisons over police has a lot to
do with the spatial logic of police and prisons. Police have two
kinds of effects on crime. First, through their immediate presence in a location they can deter crime or stop a crime in progress. Second, by arresting persons guilty of crime they can contribute to overall deterrence, specific deterrence, and incapacitation. These contributions appear to benefit the population outside the immediate neighborhood (even though the actual criminal activity of any particular arrestee is almost certainly not
Zimmerman, eds, The Handbook of the Economics of Crime (Edward Elgar 2010).
73 Kirk H. Porter, County and Township Government in the United States 93 (MacMillan 1922); Richard Briffault, OurLocalism, Part I: The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 Colum L Rev 1, 32 (1990) (noting that functions including police that are funded
primarily at the local level).
74 The effort to test the effectiveness of police strategies against crime in the 1970s at
an early stage of both police reform and adequate social science assessment of police
seemed to demonstrate that investing time and money in innovative police approaches
was of little worth. See Zimring, The Great American Crime Decline at 28-32 (cited in
note 2).

" See Stephen Levitt and Stephen Dubner, Freakonomics 124 (William Morrow
2005) (asserting some incapacitation effect from increased incarceration in the 1990s).
But see Zimring, The Great American Crime Decline at 51-2 (cited in note 2) (suggesting
that incapacitation does not explain the 1990s crime decline). As Justin McCrary pointed
out during a discussion of a draft of this paper, prison-based incapacitation relies on
police to effectuate the arrests without which there would be no prisoners to incapacitate.
However, the public does not seem to see the police behind the prison.
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random spatially). Support for more police can be hampered both
by the perception that the first kind of effect will not help those
who do not live where police are likely to be concentrated, and
the perception that the second kind of effect is either weak or
likely to be weakened by factors beyond the control of police, especially plea bargains, parole, and appellate courts.
Prisons, in contrast, promise a completely general crime control effect. Whether by deterring potential criminals or keeping
active criminals isolated, prisons promise to reduce crime for
76
everyone in the jurisdiction they serve.
The popular priority for prisons, I would argue, stems in
part from the differential spatial appeal of police and prisons to
homeowners as opposed to renters. New police are most likely to
be deployed where the crime rates are highest. Homeowners, in
contrast, are likely to try to live where crime rates are lowest.
Homeowners, as suggested above, are much more sensitive to
popular perception of their neighborhood as a high-crime neighborhood. We expect homeowners in a neighborhood with a growing reputation for crime to attempt to exit as early as possible
before prices decline further. We would also expect that people
who enter the market to buy homes seek to do so in neighborhoods not tainted with a reputation for high crime (a demand
likely to be reinforced by the higher costs of loans and insurance
in higher crime areas). 77 This is one reason why building new
homes in new neighborhoods has been so key to the overall housing market in America. Data from the 2000 census shows that
while home ownership grew between 1960 and 2000 in both nonmetropolitan areas and metropolitan areas. Within metropolitan
areas, both cities and suburbs, the highest levels of homeownership and the greatest growth has been in rural or nonmetropolitan as opposed to metropolitan areas. And within metropolitan areas, the growth has been in the suburbs rather than
78
in the city.
Since new police are likely to move in the opposite direction
from new homeowners (police to the cities, homeowners to the
76 Of course the whole logic of deterrence, whether through fear of arrest by police, or
fear of the prison sentence that may follow, are no more general than the underlying
spatial patterns of offending. My point is that the localness of the police contribution is
visible and obvious while prisons appear more general in their effect.
77 Linden and Rockoff, 98 Am Econ Rev at 1119 (cited in note 19) (estimating a 4
percent drop in the value of property within .1 miles of a sex offender); Arthur S. Goldberger and Richard Rosenfeld, eds, Understanding Crime Trends Workshop Report:
Committee on Law and Justice(National Academies 2009).
78 Hobbs and Stoops, Demographic Trends at 126 (cited in note 35).
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suburbs or even exurbs), homeowners as a class are unlikely to
favor new spending on police. Instead, they are likely to favor
prisons, which promise more general crime-control effects. Such
voters are also likely to favor laws that maximize the crimecontrol benefits of any arrests that police are able to make by
making it harder for defense lawyers to win big discounts in plea
bargaining or for prisoners to win early release through parole.
Both of these policies tend to produce mass incarceration.
Of course, homeowners are not indifferent to the potential of
police to provide immediate crime-prevention effects. But since
public spending on police is likely to favor higher-crime areas,
homeowners have thrown their financial support behind private
police services through homeowners associations and private security companies. In contrast to the public police, spending on
private police and private security has expanded enormously
during the past forty years. 79
2.

Capital punishment without executions.

California was one of the first states to reauthorize capital
punishment after 1972, but more than thirty years have passed
since the judicially imposed moratoria on state executions ended,
and despite having nearly 700 condemned persons on its death
row, California has executed only thirteen prisoners.8 0 With a
typical execution taking place nearly two decades after the
crime,8 1 it is hard to see how deterrence would differentiate the
death penalty from life in prison without parole. This is in contrast states like Texas or Virginia, where condemned inmates
8 2
can expect to die from a lethal injection in as little as five years.
Yet despite the fact that almost everyone (including the governor

79 Sklansky, 46 UCLA L Rev at 1165 (cited in note 67) ("The American private security industry today employs far more guards, patrol personnel, and detectives than the
federal, state, and local governments combined, and the disparity is growing.").
80 According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, California had 669 prisoners in custody under sentence of death at the end of 2008. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Capital
Punishment (DOJ 2010), online at http/bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/mdex.cfm?ty-tp&tid=18 (visited
Sept 15, 2010). According the Death Penalty Information Center website, California has
697 prisoners under sentence of death and has executed 13 since the current statute went
into effect in 1976. Death Penalty Information Center, State by State: California(Death
Penalty Information Center 2010), online at http/www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state
by-state (visited Sept 15, 2010).
81 Franklin E. Zimring, The Contradictionsof American Capital Punishment 81 (Oxford 2003) (it takes at least five years to obtain appellate counsel in California, which only
begins the years long process of state and federal appeals).
82 Id.
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and the state's chief justice) considers it dysfunctional,8 3 no one
expects California's death penalty to be eliminated any time
soon.
While California is extreme, many other states share the
basic characteristic of having the death penalty, and having executed someone, but doing so rarely. Thus as of 2002, while seventy-six percent of the states had the death penalty, and sixty-two
percent had executed someone since 1976, only twenty-four percent had performed more than fifteen executions since 1976.84
Indeed, in only a handful of states, almost all of them in the
South, is the number of executed prisoners even as much as a
third of the number of unexecuted but sentenced death-row in85
mates.
Why does popular support for the death penalty remain
(even if embraced with less enthusiasm then previously) despite
the fact that it is mostly a theoretical sentence? I argue that
what the death penalty really represents to states like California
is a way to maintain pressure on state officials against releasing
persons convicted of violent crimes of all sorts (not just capital
murder) from prison. Sentencing someone to death in California
is no guarantee of execution, but it is a fair guarantee that the
prisoner will never be released from prison. Support for the
death penalty, then, at least in some states, is more a reflection
of mistrust of public correctional officials to protect the public
from violent criminals than it is of a cultural endorsement of execution. From this perspective, the modern death penalty, like
mass incarceration policies generally, is mostly a way to demand
yet another layer of security for all potential victims; a demand I
have argued here is likely to be felt most intensely by homeowners. Indeed, in California, the battle over the death penalty largely left invisible the transformation of noncapital murder sentenc86
es toward de facto life sentences.
As Marie Gottschalk has argued, the most important political effect of the constitutional battle over capital punishment was
to raise the political salience of homicide at a time of growing
83 "The existing system for handling capital appeals in California is dysfunctional
and needs reform. The state has more than 650 inmates on death row, and the backlog is
growing." Ronald M. George, Op-Ed, Reform Death Penalty Appeals, LA Times (Jan 7,
2008).
84 Zimring, The Contradictionsof American CapitalPunishment at 73 (cited in note

81).
85 Id at 75.

86 On the lengthening of life sentences, see John Irwin, Lifers: Seeking Redemption in
Prison 13 (Routledge 2009).
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national anxiety over that crime. 87 The result was not just a renewal of life for capital punishment, but a general lockdown policy that has favored the incapacitation of violent and even nonviolent offenders. That this moment also coincided with the peak of
the mass expansion of homeownership in the early 1970s means
that the political question of how to respond to homicide (in other
words, whether to retain the death penalty) was put before the
country at a time when more citizens than ever before owned
their own homes and were therefore especially attuned to the
threat of violent crime.
3.

Crime and the reinvention of guns.

One of the transformations that has gone along with America's obsession with violent crime since the 1960s has been a great
increase both in gun ownership and in the political controversy
about gun control. While gun ownership has historically been
linked to many purposes including hunting, protection from
predators, and militia service, since the 1960s the defense of gun
ownership has largely concentrated on the role of guns in providing defense against violent crime.88 Whether or not private gun
ownership actually reduces crime is much debated, but what is
clear is that the idea of guns as an effective defense has at its
core a specific spatial logic. The utility of gun ownership has an
intuitive appeal in the space of the private home. It may be, especially with concealed carry laws, that gun advocates hope to
convince Americans that with their guns they can retake the
streets from criminals or protect themselves in public should
they be attacked by criminals. 89 But the key situation in which
Americans want to be armed is in protecting their home against
90
a malevolent invader.
The recent Supreme Court decision in District of Columbia v
Heller9 1 marked a triumph for the movement to recognize an in87 Marie Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass Incarceration
in America 216-17 (Cambridge 2006).
88 Jonathan Simon, Gun Rights and the ConstitutionalSignificance of Violent Crime,
12 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 335, 335 (2003).
89 See NRA, Right to Carry 2010 (NRA Apr 2010), online at http//www.nraila.
org/Issues/factsheets/read.aspx?ID=18 (visited Sept 14, 2010) (stressing role of concealed
carry laws in driving down homicide rates).
90 Home invasions foiled by armed homeowners are a stock feature of news stories
cited by NRA websites. See for example, Video Captures Home Invasion Attempt (NRA
6
Jan 2008), online at http;/www.nraila.org/newsreadfmthenews.aspx?id=104 0 (visited
Sept 14, 2010).
91 128 S Ct 2783 (2008).
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dividual right to bear arms in the Second Amendment. In striking down a DC ordinance that banned handguns even inside a
person's home, the Court recognized this individual right in a
92
context that highlighted the gun/home linkage.
B.

Space: The Forgotten Variable

In arguing that the transformation of the model American
residence from a rental unit to an owner-occupied house (typically in the suburbs, physically separated from other homes) played
a key role in predisposing Americans toward mass incarceration,
I do not mean to belittle the much more commonly cited factors
like employment, rising inequality, and racial fears or backlash.
Instead, I hope to overcome the traditional reluctance by legal
scholars and social scientists to taking the spatial dimension of
social interactions into account. 93 In this remaining Section, I
comment on how these other factors play into mass incarceration
and how they may be mediated by homeownership.
1.

Unemployment.

Sociologists have long thought that trends in labor markets
might explain variations in the quantity and quality of punishment. George Rusche and Otto Kircheimer presented one of the
first empirical studies of variations in punitiveness across the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, looking mostly at Europe. 94 They found that during periods when labor was in great
surplus and held little value, punishments were more severe and
more likely to destroy the labor value of the prisoner (through
death, mutilation, or exile). During periods when labor was
scarcer, or was being more profitably employed, punishments

92 Id at 2817-18 ("The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where the need for
defense of self, family, and property is most acute. Under any of the standards of scrutiny
that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home 'the
most preferred firearm in the nation to "keep" and use for protection of one's home and
family,' would fail constitutional muster.").
93 There has always been a tradition within sociology that has explored the role of
spatiality. See, for example, Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie, The City (Chicago 1925); Erving Goffman, Relations in Public: Microstudies of the
Public Order (Basic 1971). But since World War I this spatial or ecological focus has
been a minority approach.
94 George Rusche and Otto Kirchiemer, Punishment and Social Structure (Columbia
1939). For an effort to apply Rusche and Kirchheimer to the contemporary setting, see
Christian Parenti, Lockdown America: Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis (Verso
1999).
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became more lenient and less inconsistent with labor (or in some
95
cases, simply became a form of disciplined labor).
The 1970s did mark a significant increase in American unemployment rates, which remained comparatively high until the
late 1980s and the 1990s. As Catherine Beckett and Bruce Western have argued, incarceration helped to reduce the official unemployment rate in the 1980s and 1990s, almost enough to replace the supposed advantages of the US economy over its Euro96
pean counterparts.
But the overall pattern in unemployment trends does not
provide a particularly close fit with the political genealogy of
mass incarceration. Consider that in the late 1960s, when crime
began to be framed as a political priority, and cities began to be
defined as too dangerous for the middle class, unemployment
was quite low and the economy was inflating dangerously (as it
turned out).97 When mass incarceration policies began to gain
steam in the 1980s, unemployment was beginning to contract. In
the 1990s, when the US enjoyed its tightest employment markets
in decades, incarceration increased even as crime was dropping
visibly.
The loss of the industrial manufacturing jobs that once provided a stable bridge to the middle classes for uneducated men
and the collapse of the related industrialized sections of our great
cities have almost certainly helped generate both crime and the
appearance of blight and danger in those cities. But these losses
cannot explain the transformation of American policy toward
mass incarceration. Even a return to very full employment would
do little to diminish the fear and insecurity ordinary citizens feel
about crime.
2.

Neoliberalism.

A different kind of economic analysis of mass incarceration
has stressed not the labor market, but the larger political order
in which economic policy plays out. From this perspective, argued forcefully by sociologist Loic Wacquant, the 1970s marked a
watershed between a relatively regulated capitalist economy
aimed at producing social consensus through redistribution and
95 Rusche and Kirchheimer, Punishmentand Social Structure at 41 (cited in note 94).
96 Bruce Western and Katherine Beckett, How Unregulated Is the U.S. Labor Market?: The Penal System as a Labor Market Institution, 104 Am J Sociol 1030, 1042-43
(1999).
9' James Q. Wilson, Thinking about Crime 3-20 (Basic 1975).
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greater economic security for ordinary people, and a newly deregulated economy in which businesses were allowed to capture
greater profits while ordinary people experienced an increase in
their economic insecurity. 98 On Wacquant's account, massincarceration policies are the penal parallel to tough "workfare"
policies on the welfare side of the state. Both aim to govern a
population expected to shoulder a greater burden of economic
insecurity. The poor are governed rather directly through the
imposition of aggressive policing and mass-incarceration policies.
The middle class is disciplined ideologically, through the heightened threat of slipping out of legal work and into criminal activities that could lead to incarceration and permanent social exclusion.
Unlike the labor-market story, the neoliberalism account has
the virtue of explaining how deregulating the economy and divesting the social insurance frameworks (at least around the
poor and working classes) track the rise of mass incarceration:
they both get going in the 1980s and intensify in the 1990s. This
account also shares the perspective developed here in this Article, a focus on crime as part of a larger framework of insecurity.
My account of the homeowner's relationship to crime risk is a
reminder that insecurity about crime and insecurity about economic interests are not discrete at all. We could improve both
accounts by integrating them. Indeed, we might consider homeownership and its rise as an integral but overlooked aspect of
neoliberalism. It is the value of the home as an investment
that-until the very recent collapse of real estate prices-seemed
to allow the careful middle-class person to achieve relative economic security even without the protections of a more regulated
and secured labor market. The more a person's future economic
security depends on the value of his or her home, rather than
earning capacity, the more we might expect this person to focus
on factors like crime that could damage the value of the home. 99
3.

Racial backlash.

Sociologists and political scientists have long suspected that
the turn toward harsh punishment for crime as a major public
policy was a strategic victory for the defeated defenders of segre98 Wacquant, Punishingthe Poor at 1-7 (cited in note 1).
99 For the best effort to think about this larger political economic order in spatial
terms with a focus on prisons, see Ruth Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons,Surplus, Crisis,
and Opposition in Globalizing California(Cal 2008).
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gation in the South and those in the North who wanted to prevent school desegregation orders from being carried out there.100
The 1968 Crime Act and the Nixon law-and-order campaign were
both saturated with evidence that a racial backlash audience was
intended. Talking about reversing the overexpansion of criminal
rights and standing up for crime victims was a code for saying
that civil rights needed to be checked and that white people
needed more protection as whites from government.
But by 1980 when the policies of mass incarceration began to
be put in place, the need for the crime issues as a coded way of
opposing civil rights had passed. First, the national government
had backed off of strong support for school desegregation, and
opposition to pro-minority policies like affirmative action had
become fully respectable, and indeed was the explicit posture of
the successful 1980 Reagan campaign. Reagan also ran on his
reputation as a supporter of law and order and the death penalty, but by 1980 this was part of his general appeal to voters, not
10 1
part of his "southern strategy."
That mass incarceration is, in fact, a racial strategy is evident from the stark figures on the racial disproportionality of its
distribution. In 1999 just under one percent of working-age white
males were in prison (itself a historic high), but 7.5 percent of
working-age black males were. 10 2 This does not prove that criminal justice policies are implemented for the purpose of producing
racial inequality (the usual legal standard for discrimination),
but that does not mean structural penal racism has no subjective
or motivational content.103 Indeed, the insecurity about crime
tied up with homeownership tactic known as "blockbusting," was
invariably framed in terms of the likely crime consequences of
integration. 0 4 Indeed, the real-estate value of whiteness turned
100 See, for example, Beckett, Making Crime Pay at 28-43 (cited in note 12); Weaver,
21 Stud Am Pol Dev at 240-50 (cited in note 12).
101 See Clay Risen, The Myth of "the Southern Strategy", NY Times Mag 60 (Dec 10
2006); Lou Cannon, Governor Reagan: His Rise to Power 477-78 (Public Affairs 2003). I
am not claiming that Reagan did not appeal to southern whites on race themes; on the
contrary, my point is that he did not need to do so through tough-on-crime rhetoric in the
way a more cautious Nixon had do, partially because he could do so expressly on the
ground of affirmative action, and partially because crime fighting was becoming a crossracial feel-good issue.
102 See Bruce Western and Becky Petit, Beyond Crime and Punishment: Prisons and
Inequality, 1 Contexts 37 (2002).
103 Herndi Vera and Joe R. Feagin, Handbook of the Sociology of Racial and Ethnic
Relations (Springer 2007). See also Washington v Davis, 426 US 229 (1976) (holding that
disparate impact in the absence of discriminatory intent is not sufficient to prove a violation of equal protection).
104 See Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crises (cited in note 29); Wesley Skogan,
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all homeowners into racists because they invariably had a capital
stake in the increasing whiteness of their neighborhood.
Rather than thinking of the politics of racial separation and
the politics of crime as separate categories, we ought to see them
as integral to each other within a subjective rationality conditioned by homeownership. Indeed, to this coupling of race and
crime one should add a third, property taxes, which have perhaps exceeded the other two in being a source of political mobilization in the 1970s and since. All three come together as threats
to the middle-class homeowner since each poses, independent of
the homeowner's employment or earning power, a threat to the
major economic asset of middle class homeowners, that is, the
economic value of their home. If we look at the anti-busing and
other anti-integration measures, the anti-tax measures like California's famous Proposition 13, and the many anti-crime
measures enacted into law since the 1970s, we can see a coherent
socio-legal project of protecting the middle-class homeowner from
those factors most likely to erode the value of their home in ways
uncoupled from the overall economy.
III. CRIME AND INSECURITY AFTER THE HOUSING BUBBLE

To many contemporary observers, the fiscal crises produced
in many states by the Great Recession of 2008-2010 has created
the best opportunity in years for states to restructure policies
that have fed mass incarceration. 10 5 While I tend to agree, the
analysis offered in this Article suggests that the real promise of
the present economic crisis lies beyond any fiscal pressure it may
create for short-term reduction in spending on prisons. Instead,
the real promise lies in the potential of the crisis to mark a turning point away from policies that have made home ownership so
integral to personal security and mass homeownership integral
to our economic security.
The residential housing pattern that was still accelerating at
the time of the crash was based on marketing security as well as
shelter (largely through physical separation). This housing pattern promoted a distinctive kind of risk mentality that has
Fear of Crime and Neighborhood Change, 8 Crime & Just 203, 207-08 (1986) (few will
want to live in neighborhoods of increasing crime and fear but it is primarily those with
the most resources, rather than those with the most fear, who end up leaving).
105 See Judith Greene and Mark Mauer, Downsizing Prisons: Lessons from Four
States (The Sentencing Project 2010), online at http//www.justicestrategies.org/sites/
default/filefmcDownscalingPrisons2010.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010) (fiscal crisis is making
the costs of correction critical).
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placed stranger danger at the center of our public policies. While
the story I have outlined in this Article remains highly contextual and historical, it may be helpful to identify three distinct dynamics that appear to have been at play here.106 First, while we
are inclined to think of crime risk primarily in terms of the potential for actual criminal harm to occur, homeowners experience
an additional or secondary risk, that of the potentially catastrophic loss to property values that is caused by the occurrence
of violent crime (or sex offenses regardless of how violent they
are). This leads to the hypothesis that, at least compared to similarly situated renters, homeowners will be more attentive to signals about crime risk coming from the media regardless of their
own primary risk perception of the neighborhood.
Second, as a result of the first dynamic, the market for
homes will tend to prioritize security from crime risk at its very
core, in both location (thus the preference for "virgin" subdivisions at the outskirts of metropolitan areas) and design (thus the
preference for separation from public spaces of all sorts). The
gated community is the ultimate expression of these logics but it
can be found in more subtle forms in every part of most metropolitan areas. This creates a second dynamic. As the home as
asset becomes more defined by its security virtues, the threat of
crime becomes more pervasive, moving downward in scale toward minor crimes, delinquencies, or even just the possibility of
exposure to people suspected of participating in any of the above
(such as urban teenagers). Those who invest in the most securitized exurban homes are likely to be even more vigilant in the
well-known logic of NIMBY ("not in my backyard") and apply it
not simply to drug treatment centers or jails but to bike paths
and bus stops. This leads to two hypotheses: that over time
homes should become more visibly security oriented and citizens
should become more sensitive to crime risk.
Third, independent of the first two dynamics, the residential
real estate market in parts of the country became superheated
beginning in the mid-1980s, and with even greater generality
and intensity after the recession of the early 1990s. In this period, perhaps as a result of government policies expressed through
low interest rates and the avowed policies of both Democratic
and Republican administrations to move more Americans of
modest means toward homeownership, home values grew rapidly
106 This will facilitate testing the argument made here which is so contextual that it
cannot be replicated (even analogically) without some abstraction.
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over a sustained period of time, giving some long-time residents
in these areas extraordinary windfalls when they sold, and enticing many buyers into the market in the hopes of being able to
extract enough value in a short time to purchase another home
at better terms.
While these features of what we may now think of as "bubble
behavior" are economic, they also may have political consequences. Specifically, homeowners inside the bubble, who experience
the reality or possibility of enormous expansion of their asset
value may come to see not just their long-term savings, but their
ongoing social and economic security as rooted in the home itself
and not in the economic relations that presumably qualified
them for the home loan in the first place. 10 7 This leads to the
fourth hypothesis, the sensitivity of residents to crime (and support for the policies of mass incarceration that are determined by
home-based crime fear as described above) should reach its
strongest where bubble conditions persist over periods of time
long enough to significantly reset political preferences.1 0 8 This
very much describes America in 1994-2007 when mass incarceration deepened at a time of sharp drops in crime across the country. Does it describe the future?
Coming as it does at a time of growing media attention to
and public fears of climate change, 10 9 as well as related insecurity about the energy supply, 110 the current economic crisis is causing some to question the sustainability of our current securityoriented housing pattern. 1 Not only are many of these issues
potentially far bigger than crime but what we might call (follow107 We are, of course, now acutely aware how weak some of those economic relations
behind the loans were.
108 How long is long enough? The housing bubble may have been a relatively shortterm phenomenon in many place, but in states like Florida, Arizona, and California, the
real estate market had been producing dramatic climbs for decades. While a brief escalation of housing prices is unlikely to remake the political preferences of homeowners, a
sustained periods of price inflation over twenty years or more is surely long enough.
109 Graham Allison, Energy Security: What Can We Really Do?, PostGlobal (Apr 18,
2007), online at http//newsweek.washingtonpost.co/postglobal/needtoknow/2007/04/
energy-security-what can we re.html (visited Oct 4, 2010) (reporting that the Intergovernmental Report on Climate Change recently released its annual report, declaring with
90 percent certainty that climate change is caused by humankind).
110 The depth of our insecurities related to energy were tragically exposed this spring
by the catastrophic leak of oil into the Gulf of Mexico from BPs deep ocean drilling platform. The catastrophe is one of the greatest environmental disasters in US history and
seems likely to prompt major changes in both energy policy and national priorities. See
Peter Baker, Obama Seeks to Shift Arc of Oil Crisis,NY Times Al (June 16, 2010).
111 Richard Florida, How the Crash Will Reshape America, Atlantic Monthly 44
(March 2009).
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ing Joseph Gusfield) this new culture of public problems1 1 2 has
already had powerful, potentially narrative-changing events (like
the Kitty Genovese or the Tate-Labianca murders) with massive
media coverage-for example, the flooding of New Orleans after
Hurricane Katrina in 2005.113 The enduring power of crime in
our imagination of threat was reflected in the fact that lurid stories of violent crime, mostly untrue, came to dominate the media
114
coverage of the events and some of the policy lesson drawing.
But the tabloid-like stories of babies being raped and murdered
bodies piling up could not altogether hide from America the
shocking lack of preparedness by governments at all levels to
protect the lives or property of US residents. The media focus on
crime reminds us how easy it remains (and will remain) to stampede Americans around crime fear, but it did not succeed in wiping out the uncanny sense left by Katrina.
If the current economic crisis-which is, after all, focused on
the housing market and causing prolonged contraction in the
lending necessary to make home purchases viable for middle
class families-turns out to be a significant conjuncture in the
American style of housing and asset accumulation, we may mark
this moment as the end of the era of mass imprisonment. Looking back historically from that future vantage point, we can see
two quite distinct governmental logics through which twentiethcentury Americans were offered social and economic security,
both with roots in the New Deal. From the early 1900s on, employment and social entitlements linked to employment (Social
Security and later Medicare) formed an anchor of security for
Americans, one which broadened and deepened during the New
Deal. 11 5 This centering of work and employment at the center of
security (think of our health and pension systems, which were
based on employment in this era) helped keep other kinds of risk,
including work accidents, environmental pollution, and crime, in

112 See Joseph Gusfield, The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the

Symbolic Order (Chicago 1984) (arguing that the ascension of a particular social problem,
like driving under the influence of alcohol, is a way of moralizing certain features of the
social order rather than an inevitable reflection of risks).
113 See Jonathan S. Simon, Wake of the Flood: Crime,Disaster,and the American Risk
Imaginary after Katrina, Article 4, Issues in Legal Scholarship, Catastrophic Risks: Prevention, Compensation, and Recovery (Bepress 2007), online at http;//www.bepress.com/
fls/iss10/art4 (visited Oct 3, 2010).
114 Id.
115 See generally Lisabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago,
1919-1939 (Cambridge 1991).
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their place as subordinate to employment security and the government's paramount responsibility for managing the economy.
During the 1960s and 1970s, political returns on this employment-based security began to wane (as global economic competition put an end to ever-rising wages) and while employment
remained central, gradually more Americans began to place more
of their sense of security in their ownership of a piece of private
property, their home, which provided at least the certainty of
comfort in old age and the possibility of leaving a legacy to one's
children. This homeowner citizenship was also based in the New
Deal, which thought of it as an adjunct to the working life. After
1980, however, these homeowner citizens came to view government more in terms of what it could do to protect those property
values and how it might threaten them. 116 In the 1980s and
1990s, in some parts of the country, this escalated to the point
where for some citizens the home may have replaced the job as
the primary source of security (even as it continued to supplement the income provided by work). The extraordinary sense of
value and vulnerability associated with the home made fear of
homicide and a politics of mass imprisonment a logical if not in11 7
evitable focus for government.
What is next? We can only speculate. If we think about the
gated community house located at the exurban edge of the metropolitan area as the idealized housing unit for a society where
housing is deeply infused with concerns for security against violence from dangerous strangers, we can ask what the idealized
housing unit is for a society more focused on risks created by infrastructure failure and economic instability. The new American
metropolitan ideal designed to respond to "infrastructure risks"
rather than "stranger danger" will look more like the urban
America that predominated before the housing booms of 1950-70
and 1985-2005: inner-ring suburb and central city rather than
exurban; denser, with more mixed-use neighborhoods with
apartments, workshops, offices, schools, shops, and public transportation.
There are two things to notice about the potential for this
trend. First, to the extent that it takes off, the current security
116 See McGirr, Suburban Warriors (cited in note 31).
117 Some observers in the early 1980s expected environmentalism and demands to
eliminate pollution from the American landscape to become the dominant political formation. See Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the
Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers(Cal 1982). Pollution concerns also
have a resonance to homeowners and the desire for clean air and water (if not chemicalfree homes) has been an influential value.
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housing stock will become significantly devalued because it will
lack all of the traits made desirable by the new housing ideal.
Much of the panoply of public and private investments that have
gone along with security housing-including mass incarceration;
underinvestment in public police; death penalties aimed at keeping violent felons, both capital and non-capital, locked up forever;
and even private guns-will also suffer a substantial devaluation.
Consider that the central city renter, living in a rental unit
near his or her school, job, parks, and health services, will find
little reassurance in a system premised on cycling offenders back
and forth between prisons and those very same central cities, or
on keeping a select group of violent felons locked up through
their old age (providing theoretical deterrence and layers of incapacitation protection to gated communities with their home
alarm systems), as against preventive policing measures targeted at the common corridors linking the destinations of people. In
dense city neighborhoods with homes and businesses nearby,
race is much less likely to be an overarching code for crime risk.
Urban dwellers have also proven far less enamored of private
118
weaponry as a key to personal security.
If this scenario were to play out, one could imagine a longterm shift in public-safety values, away from stranger danger
and mass imprisonment (along with the other features), and toward infrastructure danger and demands for a new generation of
metropolitan infrastructures, from water and power to public
transit. The costs of the latter would probably quickly exceed
what we now spend on mass imprisonment, but in any event
would require us to rapidly dismantle much of that system and
redirect future investment toward infrastructure (along with
higher taxes for the middle classes in the form of reduced mortgage-interest-based deductions).1 1 9
But there is a second thing to notice about the scenario I
have imagined away from our heavy reliance on security through
homeownership and homeownership focused on security: it remains extremely sensitive to crime itself. The dense multiuse
118 People in cities with large police forces are more likely to support gun control. See
Gary Kleck, Crime, Culture Conflict and the Sources of Support for Gun Control: A Multilevel Application of the General Social Survey, 39 Am Behav Scientist 387, 398 (1996).
119 1 am speaking hypothetically and aspirationally enough that I will not try to lay
out the actual budget consequences, but there are plenty of current efforts. See Susan
Tucker and Eric Cadora, Justice Reinvestment (Ideas for an Open Society Nov 2003),
online
at
http/www.soros.org/resources/articles_publications/publication
ideas
20040106 (visited Sept 15, 2010).
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urban neighborhoods I am projecting are precisely what seemed
to become unsustainable during the crime wave of the 1960s;
Americans still associate cities with crime risk. The success of
many major cities in luring back some middle-class population
during the 1990s was partially a testament to the crime decline
and remains vulnerable to a reversal of it. Moreover, even if
strong enough economic incentives pull middle-class people back
into rental housing in urban neighborhoods despite crime fears,
the middle class may come back with housing and schooling demands fashioned to recreate the exclusionary logics of suburban1 20
ization.
As we move beyond the era of housing, homicide, and mass
imprisonment we are not altogether helpless to influence the
course of change. For those of us who prefer a move away from
the late-twentieth-century model of mass home ownership and
mass incarceration, the challenge is to define those interim policies that help address the major insecurities around crime that
remain a feature of many central cities (although others have
made remarkable progress). First, government must take the
new renting middle class seriously as interlocutors in whatever
new security strategies are attempted. These citizens may be far
less locked into a crime-victim vision of themselves than the past
generation, 121 but they are not going to tolerate indifference to
preventable violence that strikes families and homes (whether
rented or owned). These families are likely to be very sensitive to
violent crime, but also more pragmatic about solutions (this is
what the public arguments about resource trade-offs between
law enforcement and capital punishment are aimed at).
The fact that these families are not homeowners will insulate them from some of the NIMBY concerns that have discouraged creation of resources in the community, like drug treatment
centers or mental health facilities, that would actually improve
public safety even as they might reduce home prices. Moreover,
once located in cities, perhaps as renters, this new middle class
will be more likely to support crime-control policies based on policing, reentry, and harm reduction over mass-incarceration policies built to favor the exurbs.
120 Once again I do not plan here to offer support for what remains an extended hypothetical but one can see versions of this in gentrification patterns of the 19 90s like highsecurity apartment buildings and charter schools designed to exclude the children of the
most disorganized poor. See Andrea McArdle and Tanya Erzen, Zero Tolerance: Quality of
Life and the New Police Brutality in New York City (NYU 2001).
121 Garland, The Culture of Control at 11 (cited in 3); Simon, Governing through Crime
at 77 (cited in note 5).
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But they will not favor doing nothing to address patterns of
preventable violence and widespread public disorder. Recent experience, especially in New York, suggests that cities and suburban communities (because it is primarily the exurbs that will
shrink) can address many of these concerns through local agencies. 122 The most obvious and by now well-tested approach is to
build up the size and engagement of police departments, which
as we have seen, have been the big losers in the building up of
mass imprisonment. It also includes the whole panoply of countylevel services ranging from probation and juvenile justice to
mental health. These may not be the public policy directions favored by those who are currently leading the anti-mass incarceration movement, but they may be essential to underwriting that
objective.

122

See Zimring, The GreatAmerican Crime Decline (cited in note 2).

